ily adm its, Putnam was not the first to put forward the im portance of social capital, it was clearly he who show ed how it could be used in im portant (and very ingeniously designed) em pirical research (1993).
Putnam 's w ork cam e largely to be interpreted as putting the im por tance o f civil society and voluntary associations on the agenda. By being active in voluntary associations, citizens would learn to develop social trust and understand the im portance o f positive reciprocity (Rothstein 2011 ). For many, this provided argum ents for a political agenda in which the responsibilities o f the state for social welfare should be scaled back and replaced with an em ph asis on the im portance o f voluntary asso ciations. It was argued th at one had reason to expect th at w ith "big governm ent" we should see a "crowding out" effect. The expansion of the responsibilities o f the state should, it was argued, be detrim ental to the developm ent o f a vibrant civil society (Ostrom 2000) . Moreover, it w as argued that in a society w here the governm ent takes on the social research Vol. 80 : No. 4 : W inter 2013 1009 responsibility for a large num ber o f social needs, people do not have to develop and m aintain trusting relations and invest in social networks (Cohen and Arato 1993) . Social capital research has to a large extent been used by several governm ents and policy organizations to send a m essage to people that the b ad things in their society are caused by too little volunteering (Putnam and Feldstein 2003; W inter 2002; Woolcoclc and Narayan 2000) .
However, w h en the so cial cap ital and social tru st research agenda w ent com parative, it cam e as a su rprise to m any th at w hen th is concept w as b e in g em pirically research ed, the N ordic coun tries cam e out on top irrespective o f w hat m easures were bein g used (Rothstein 2002) . M uch can be said about the Nordic countries, b u t not that they are countries w ith sm all and noninterventionist govern m ents. In fact, available em pirical studies show that in terp erson al (Leung et al. 2011; Helliwell 2006; Dinesen 2013; Delhey and Newton 2005; Uslaner 2002 ).
social research
The sam e positive pattern exists at the societal level. Cities, regions, and countries w ith m ore tru stin g people are likely to have better w orking dem ocratic institutions, m ore open econom ies, greater econom ic grow th, and less crim e and corruption (Bjornskov 2009 , Keefer, and Knack 2005 , Richey 2010 Uslaner 2008 ). Both at the indi vidual and societal level, m any things that are norm atively desirable seem connected to social trust and social capital.
As stated above, social tru st varies w idely across nations. In Norway, Denm ark, and the Netherlands, around 60 percent o f people state in surveys th at they believe m ost other people can be trusted, while in Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey, around 10 percent state that they think people in general can be trusted (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) . As for the interpretation o f w hat the standard survey question about social trust m easures, I have come to support the idea launched by Uslaner (2002) as w ell as by Delhey and Newton (2004) , who argue th at when people say w hether or not they th in k th at "m ost other people can be trusted," this can be understood as their evaluation o f the m oral standard o f the society in which they live. This im plies that trust can be seen as an inform al institution, as argued by North, and there fore as a source o f social solidarity, creating a b elief system according to which the various groups in society have a shared responsibility to provide public goods as well as possibilities for those who happen to be endowed with fewer resources (Uslaner 2002, chap. 7) .
The theoretical reason trust is im portant com es from "the prob lem with m any n am es" in the social sciences. Am ong these nam es are social dilem m as, the problem o f collective action, the provision of public goods, the tragedy o f the com m ons, and the prisoners' dilemma (cf. Ostrom 1998) . Behind all these m etaphors lies a problem that can be described as follows: a group o f agents know that if they can collaborate they will all gain. However, this collaboration is not costless but carries econom ic burdens or other effort for all involved. W ithout the contri bution o f (almost) all agents, the good w ill n ot be produced because it m akes no sense for the individual agent to contribute if she or he does not tru st th at (almost) everyone else will contribute. Moreover,
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w hat is goin g to be produced is by definition a public good and can thereby be consum ed by everyone regardless o f w hether or not any given individual has contributed. There is thus always a risk that agents will act opportunistically (a.k.a. free-ride), hoping that they can reap the benefits o f the good without contributing. W ithout trust that m ost agents will refrain from such treacherous behavior, m ost agents will not contribute to the good in question. The end result o f this lack o f trust is that everyone in the group stands to lose, although all know that i f they could trust each other they would all be better off.
Exam ples o f this problem are endless. It m akes no sense to be the only one who recycles the garbage, pays w hat is to be paid in taxes, does not abuse the social insurance system, follows the rule o f law, abstains from participating in corruption, does not overuse the group's com m on natural resources, or shows up well prepared to the academ ic depart m ent's research seminar. Since trust is a psychologically delicate thing that is hard to repair once it has becom e truly dam aged, I prefer the m etaphor "social traps," since agents in a group that have lost trust in one another cannot easily m im ic or fabricate the level o f trust needed to ensure collaboration even i f they all know that they would benefit i f they could (Ostrom 1998; Rothstein 2005 ).
IF THAT IMPORTANT, H O W CAN SO CIAL TRUST BE

CREATED?
The problem with this research approach is that in the abundance o f positive associations between generalized trust, social capital, and vari ous desired social and political outcomes, the sources o f social trust have rem ained som ew hat o f a mysteiy. Sim ply put, i f social trust/capital is such an im portant societal resource, we need to know m ore about how it is generated and m aintained (Hooghe and Stolle 2003) . Another study, also based on comparative survey data, concludes that "the central contention . . . is that political institutions that support norm s o f fairn ess, universality, and the division o f pow er contribute to the form ation o f inter-personal tru st" (Freitag and Buhlmann 2005) .
U sin g scen ario ex p erim en ts in low tru st/h igh corrup tion R om ania an d in high trust/low corruption Sweden, Rothstein and Eek (2009) found that people in both these countries who experience corruption am ong public health-care workers or the local police when travelling in an "unknow n city in an unfam iliar country" do not only lose trust in th ese authorities but also in other people in gen eral in that "unknow n" society. Another exam ple is based on survey data from the European Social Survey carried out in 2008 that covers 29 coun tries in both W estern and Eastern Europe (Svallfors 2013) . This survey asked questions related to corruption, such as w hether respondents perceived that the tax authorities or public health care gave "special advantages to certain people or deal with everyone equally." The results are the following: citizens who state in the survey that they have a pref erence for m ore econom ic equality but live in a country w here they perceive that the quality o f government institutions is low will in the sam e survey indicate that they prefer lower taxes and less social spend ing. However, the sam e "ideological type" o f respondent who happens to live in a European country where he or she believes that the govern m ent authorities are guided by norm s such as im partiality and fairness will answer that he or she is willing to pay higher taxes for m ore social spending. This result is supported in a study using aggregate data about welfare state spending and quality o f governm ent for W estern liberal democracies (Rothstein, Samanni, and Teorell 2012) . W hen controlling for variables that m easure political m obilization and electoral success from left parties, the higher the quality o f government, the m ore coun tries will spend on social services and benefits. To sum m arize our inter pretation o f these studies, citizens who live in a country where they perceive that corruption or other form s o f unfairness in the public adm inistration is com m on are likely to be less supportive o f the idea that the state should take responsibility for policies even if they ideo logically support the goals such policies have. One likely reason is that they lack trust in other citizens to (a) pay their taxes and (b) not overuse or abuse the social insurances.
Another recent large-scale survey consisting o f 84,000 citizens/ respondents in 212 regions within 25 European countries gives strong support to the theory that high levels o f corruption/low levels o f quality o f governm ent is a causal factor behind low social trust. In addition to It should be underlined that these scholars find that social trust is related not to w hat takes place on the "input" side o f the represen tational dem ocratic system but to w hat goes on at the "output" side in the public adm inistration: the police, the courts, and public services. Social tru st as an inform al institution is essen tial if groups or societies will succeed in establishing socially efficient form al institu tions such as the rule o f law, im partial civil services, and uncorrupt public adm inistrations. The reason is that such form al institutions are "second order" public goods and thereby prone to the standard prob lem s o f free-riding as w ell as opportunistic and treacherous behavior.
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It is in these ways that social tru st can be seen as a collective asset, a social capital (Coleman 1990, 99) . This im plies that the outcom e o f social and econom ic interactions depends on how the real-life context has constructed the agen ts' m utual expectations about w hat kind o f reciprocity to expect and w hether the other agents can be trusted or not (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005) . As has been argued from the perspec tive o f evolutionary gam e theory, people cannot be expected to base their decisions about "how to play" in social dilem m as on perfect infor m ation about others because such inform ation is im possible to get.
Instead, they will try to m ake inferences from "the history o f play" o f other people (Young 1998, 5) . Moreover, it is not the case that economic com petition betw een rational agents w ill w eed out agents with low trust and replace them with high trust agents, not even over the long run. On the contraiy, as Douglass North has argued:
The rational choice paradigm assum es that people know w hat is in their self-interest and act accordingly, or at the very least that com petition will w eed out those who m ake in correct choices and rew ard those w ho m ake correct choices. But it is im possible to reconcile this argum ent w ith the historical and contem porary record (North 1998b, 493; cf. Frohlich and Oppenheimer 2006) . I thus agree with Miller that the m ajor lesson we should take from noncooperative game theory for this discussion is not about choice, strat egy, or individual rationality but that we have good reasons to expect "dysfunctional results from individual rationality" (Miller 2000, 540) . However, as the huge variation in the level o f social trust and levels o f corruption between countries shows, the type o f theory we need is not a general (more or less structural-functionalist) one starting from some universal notion o f human behavior. The reason for this is simple, nam ely that such a theoiy cannot explain the huge variation that exists (unless one argues that there are genetic variations in the ability to make rational choices or develop social trust). Similarly, the type o f theories we 1018 social research need are not the ones that explain why all societies end up with socially efficient (or dysfunctional) institutions. Rather, the sort o f theory we need is one that can explain the huge variation in social trust and levels o f corruption and the quality o f government that exists in the world today.
Or in plain language, why, for instance, is corruption in Denmark lower than in Nigeria, social trust in Finland so m uch higher than in Romania, and why are the inform al social institutions that em bed m arket relations in Mexico different from those in Canada?
The epistem ological approach known as scientific realism puts The results they present in their study (based also on scenario experi m ents) show th at "fair procedures" increase cooperation. This seem s to be based on the following causality: institutions that are perceived to be fair increase group identity and affiliation so that the goal o f the group m erges w ith the goal o f the individuals. "Being treated fairly and respectfully w ill install am ong group m em bers a feeling o f inclusive n ess" from which also follows increased social trust (De Cremer et al. 2005, 402) . This is in line with the experim ental results from the "hori zontal trust gam e," which shows that individuals who sense a higher affiliation to the group also trust that others in the group will recipro cate (Ostrom 2005, 74) .
It is n ot self-evident that people w ho live in highly corrupt societies should have low social trust. One could m ake the opposite Corruption and Social Trust 1019 argum ent, that in order to m ake life bearable in a veiy corrupt or clientelistic society, ordinary citizens have to develop a lot o f inform al social contacts that they can trust. However, this does not seem to be the case.
Instead, they seem to develop m istrust, envy, pessim ism , and cyni cism toward "people in general" (Csepeli et al. 2004 ). The type o f trust they m ay develop is w hat Uslaner (2002) sions from the actions they observe in others-and they also draw conclusions in the other direction. As the saying goes: "To know on eself is to know others."
RECIPROCITY, CO RRUPTIO N, AND SOCIAL TRUST
When striving for a society with low corruption and high social trust, it is im portant to start from a correct understanding o f "hum an nature."
Ideas about "basic hum an nature" have had a long history in the social sciences. I believe the m atter has finally been resolved, m ostly by Corruption and Social Trust 1021 experim ental research (Henrich 2010; Bicchieri and Xiao 2009; Fehr and Gintis 2007; Henrich 2004; Gintis et al. 2005) . To m ake a long story short, the idea o f m an as a "hom o econom icus" has sim ply been refuted by this type o f research. The results from laboratory-, fieldwork-, and survey-based research that speak again st m an as a utility-m axim iz ing rational agent are by now overwhelming. Self-interest is for sure an im portant ingredient w hen people decide how to act, but it is far from as dom inating as has been portrayed in neoclassic econom ics.
Moreover, it would be im possible to solve the problem o f corruption if individual utility-maximizing self-interest were the only gam e in town.
The reason is that such individuals would always fall for the tem ptation to "free-ride." If a m ajority do this, such uncorrupt institutions would never be established, and if by som e chance uncorrupt institutions did exist they would soon be destroyed. If all agents acted according to the tem plate prescribed in neoclassic econom ic theory, they would sooner or later ou tsm art them selves into a suboptim al equilibrium . This is a "social tra p " type o f situation, where all agents w ould be w orse off because even if they know they would all gain from cooperation, lack ing tru st in the oth ers' cooperation, they w ould them selves abstain from cooperating (Rothstein 2005 ).
However, this new experim en tal (and to som e exten t, field) research does not present hum ans as benevolent altruists prepared to trust other individuals no m atter what. Trust as such can certainly not be a virtue (as trustw orthiness is) since trusting opportunistic, corrupt, and treacherous individuals or organizations is not only stupid b u t often also quite dangerous. Such "blind tru stin g" altruistic individuals are luckily also quite rare. W hat com es out from the experim ental research m entioned above is instead that reciprocity is the basic hum an orienta tion. The central idea here is that people are not so m uch m otivated by utility-based calculations or culturally induced norms. Instead, hum an behavior is to a large extent determ ined by forward-looking strategic thinking in the sense that w hat agents do depends on what they think the other agents are going to do. Thus, the idea o f reciprocity recasts fundam entally how we should understand and explain hum an behav ior. Instead o f looking backw ard to w hat causes variation in utilitybased interests or culturally-induced norm s, the im portant thing is to understand how people's forw ard-looking perceptions about "other people" and especially their trustw orthiness are constructed. Historical experiences and "collective m em ories" certainly play a role here, but research also shows that people update their perceptions based on new inform ation (Boyd, Gintis, and Bowles 2010) .
R egardin g the prospect for social tru st and cooperation for public goods, results from research show that m ost people are w ill ing to engage in cooperation for com m on goals even if they will not personally benefit from this m aterially (Levi 1998) . However, for this to happen, three specific conditions m ust be in place. First, people have to be convinced that the policy is m orally justified (substantial justice).
Second, people have to be convinced that m ost other agents can also be trusted to cooperate-that is, that other agents are likely to abstain from "free-riding." Third, people have to be convinced that the policy can be im plem en ted in a fair and evenhanded m an ner (Levi 1998; Rothstein 1998) . The first issue is for the political philosophers to solve.
However, contrary to w hat m ost philosophers think-that a com m on goal is norm atively justified-is not enough to m otivate people to coop erate. They need to be convinced that there are institutions that will act so as to m ake free-riding the exception. For exam ple, a tax adm inistra tion that allows for m assive tax evasion or a social insurance system th at cannot control overuse or abuse w ill be detrim ental not only for achieving w hat is considered norm atively ju st but also for social trust. In addition, the requirem ent for procedural ju stice dem ands that public institutions m ust be able to deliver goods, services, and the whether "other people in general" in their society can be trusted. My interpretation o f these studies is that citizens that live in a country where they perceive that corruption or other form s o f u nfairness in the public adm inistration is com m on are likely to be less supportive o f the idea that there should be a collective responsibility for policies for increased social justice even if they ideologically support the goals o f these policies. The m ost likely reason is not that they are against increased social justice or m ore public goods but that they will believe that their social trust w ill not be reciprocated.
THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF TRUST A N D CO RRUPTIO N
It is im portant to realize that reciprocity also has a dark side. History and m any contem porary events as well as experim ental evidence show that "ordinary people" are willing to engage in the m ost horrible atrocities to other people (again, also if they do not personally benefit from their actions) if they are convinced that those "other people" w ould other wise harm them . However, bad reciprocity also exists in less dram atic (and horrible) circum stances. As described by Fehr and Fishbacher (2005, 167) , "If people believe that cheating on taxes, corruption and abuses o f the welfare state are wide-spread, they them selves are more likely to cheat on taxes, take bribes or abuse welfare state institutions." D istrust in other agents or in the institutions m ay lead to a vicious circle that can break any system or policy set up to increase solidarity.
Again, Rawls did clearly see this problem between institutional design and support for justice (which has sadly been neglected by m ost o f his follow ers in political philosophy):
For although m en know that they share a com m on sense o f justice and that each wants to adhere to existing arrange m ents, they m ay nevertheless lack full confidence in one another. They m ay suspect that som e are not doing their part, and so they m ay be tem pted not to do theirs. The general aw areness o f these tem ptation s m ay eventually cause the schem e to break down. The suspicion that others are not honoring their duties and obligations is increased by the fact that, in absence o f the authoritative interpreta tion and enforcem ent o f the rules, it is particularly easy to find excuses for breaking them (Rawls 1971, 240) .
It is clear th at Rawls pointed to the problem o f reciprocity in the form o f tru st in others ("confidence") and that he argues th at it is the existence o f institutional arrangem ents that can handle "free riding" and other form s o f antisocial and opportunistic behavior that are needed to avoid the breakdown o f system s based on principles o f justice.
Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that the basic nature o f hum an behavior-reciprocity-can go both ways. On the one hand, the idea o f reciprocity stands against the cynicism about hum an nature central to the interest-based theories that have dom inated m ost econom ic approaches in the social sciences (Ostrom 1998 (Ostrom , 2000 . On the other hand, reciprocity is also in conflict w ith a naïve idea about hum an nature as genuinely benevolent and trusting. Instead, reciprocity tells us that if through the design o f institutions we can m ake people trust that m ost other agents in their society will behave in a trustworthy and cooperative m anner, they themselves will do likewise. If not, they will defect, even if the outcom e will be a social trap type o f situation and thereby detrim ental to their interests.
That reciprocity can go in different directions is also w hat we see if we take ju st a sim ple look at m ost o f the rankings o f a country's perform ance that have now becom e abundant. The level o f corrup tion, to take ju st one exam ple, shows staggering differences between countries. This particular "social b ad " also serves as a good exam ple o f why reciprocity is a better starting point for understanding hum an behavior than its rivals. If we relied on cultural explanations, we would have to say to our sisters and brothers in, for exam ple, Nigeria that the extrem ely high level o f corruption in their country is caused by their corrupt culture. Or if we started from interest-based explanations, we would be unable to explain why the huge variation o f corruption exists without relying on either genetic or cultural explanations. However, if we base our explanations on the idea o f reciprocity, the explanation for the high level o f corruption in, for exam ple, Pakistan is that the institutions in place m ake it reasonable for m ost people to believe that m ost other agents will be engaged in corrupt practices, and thus they have no reason to believe that "in general, m ost people can be trusted" (Rothstein 2010) . Simply put, it m akes no sense to be the only honest policem an in a thoroughly corrupt police force.
It is im portan t to underline that, contrary to w hat is taken for gran ted in n eoclassical econom ics, we have absolutely no reason to believe that societies (or any group o f agents) are able to produce the type o f noncorrupt, im partial, and fair institutions that they as a soci ety would prosper from. A quick look at available m easures show s that a vast m ajo rity o f the w orld's population lives u n der eith er deeply or fairly corrupt public authorities (H olm berg and R othstein 2012).
History has turned out not to be efficient. The generally high levels o f corruption and low levels o f QoG th at we find in m ost contem porary countries turn out to have devastating effects on prosperity, social well-being, health, satisfaction w ith life and, o f course, social trust. The lives o f m ost people living under these conditions are, as another fam ous philosopher stated it, likely to be "solitary, poor, brut ish, nasty, and short."
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